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ixia



Hexcellents

## Session 0x9 Defense Mechanisms

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Security Summer School

ACS/Ixia/Hexcellents

# Classes of Defense Mechanisms

- restricting information

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- bit in page table entries
- requires hardware, kernel support
- enabled/disabled through compiler flags

# Bypass NX

- ret-to-plt, ret-to-libc
- Return Oriented Programming (ROP)
- mprotect()



- ELF segments specify required permissions
- loader maps segments in memory pages
- permissions can later be changed using `mprotect()`

# Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)

- maps regions at random addresses
- stack, data (heap), shared libraries, VDSO page
- PIE: binary image is also relocated

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- invariants
  - page alignment
  - contiguous mappings
  - order of mappings
  - value range (entropy)
  - preserved in child processes

# Bypass ASLR

- information leak
- partial overwrites
- bruteforce (32 bit)
- NOP sled
- jmp esp

# Stack Protection Mechanisms

- address the issue of stack buffer overflows
- stack protector ("canary"): secret value placed in stack frame
- SafeStack (clang): separation in safe stack and unsafe stack
- require compiler support

- protection against buffer overflows
- library functions are replaced with fortified versions
- perform checks on buffer lengths at runtime
- requires compiler support



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- bypass: other code pointers (GOT in libraries, application-specific pointers, return address)

- sandbox based on syscall filtering
- set up by the application at runtime via `prctl`
- enforced by the kernel
- `libseccomp`, `seccomp-BPF`

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- restricting information: ASLR, PIE, stack protectors, pointer guarding
- limiting control flow: CFI (clang), CFG (Windows)
- runtime checks: FORTIFY, seccomp
- least privilege: NX, SafeStack, RELRO



# Resources

- <https://libc.blukat.me/>
- [https://refspecs.linuxbase.org/LSB\\_4.1.0/LSB-Core-generic/LSB-Core-generic/libcman.html](https://refspecs.linuxbase.org/LSB_4.1.0/LSB-Core-generic/LSB-Core-generic/libcman.html)
- <https://medium.com/@HockeyInJune/relro-relocation-read-only-c8d0933faef3>
- <https://lwn.net/Articles/656307/>
- <https://lwn.net/Articles/593476/>